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Adult women and ADHD: on the temporal dimensions of ADHD 
identities 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper uses conceptual resources drawn psychosocial process thinking (Stenner, 
2017, Brown and Reavey, 2015, Brown and Stenner, 2009) and from G.H. Mead in 
particular, to contribute to an emerging body of work on the experiences of adult 
women with ADHD (Singh, 2002, Waite and Ivey, 2009, Quinn and Madhoo, 2014, 
Horton-Salway and Davies, 2018). It has a particular focus on how ADHD features in 
the construction of women’s identities and life-stories and it draws upon findings 
from a qualitative investigation of adult women diagnosed or self-diagnosed with 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). A theoretically informed ‘thematic 
decomposition’ of 16 depth interviews reveals how complex processes of identity 
transformation are mediated by the social category of ADHD. Through this process, 
pasts are reconstructed from the perspective of an ‘emergent’ identity that offers 
participants the potential for a more enabling and positive future. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper uses conceptual resources drawn psychosocial process thinking (Stenner, 
2017, Brown and Reavey, 2015, Brown and Stenner, 2009) and from G.H. Mead in 
particular, to contribute to an emerging body of work on the experiences of adult 
women with ADHD (Singh, 2002, Waite and Ivey, 2009, Quinn and Madhoo, 2014, 
Horton-Salway and Davies, 2018). It has a particular focus on how ADHD features in 
the construction of women’s identities and life-stories. Although potentially relevant 
to a broader literature on mental health, gender, memory and diagnosis (see Cromby 
et al, 2013), the paper responds to four specific developments:  
 
1. Growing numbers of people are accommodating the category of ADHD into 
their identity as the extent of ADHD diagnosis is rapidly increasing, both 
amongst children (Hamed et al, 2015 estimate up to an 11% prevalence rate 
totalling at around 6.4 million children with ADHD in the USA alone) and 
adults (Weyandt & DuPaul, 2006, Barkley, 2015);  
2. Research to date has been dominated by a focus on children and on male 
children in particular, with more boys than girls being diagnosed by ratios up 
to 10/1 in clinical settings (Williamson and Johnston, 2015);  
3. Recent years have seen a large increase in the number of adult diagnoses, and 
within this, women’s rates of diagnosis are notably increasing, such that the 
gender prevalence ratio narrows markedly with age. According to Williamson 
and Johnston (2015), the gender gap of a 10/1 ratio of boys to girls narrows to 
2.73/1 amongst adults. They also indicate that, compared to men, women are 
more likely to be diagnosed with ADHD as adults, suggesting a subset for 
whom any childhood ADHD went undiagnosed. This raises questions 
concerning the processes through which ADHD is recognised by or for such 
women, and the impact this recognition may have upon their lives; 
4. Although not all who meet the diagnostic criteria claim ADHD as an identity, 
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there has been a growth in the number of women who have identified 
sufficiently with the category of ADHD to self-diagnose (Conrad and Potter, 
2000). This may relate to what Williamson and Johnston (2015, p.23) 
describe as ‘higher rates of treatment seeking for adult women compared to 
men’, but it is also possible that some women who self-diagnose are not 
motivated to go on to secure a formal diagnosis. Either way, the question of 
why and how women ‘self-diagnose’ (whether or not they go onto a formal 
diagnosis) is of particular interest given the context described above.  
 
In DSM-5 ADHD is defined as a pattern of inattention that may or may not include 
impulsivity/hyperactivity. The symptoms of inattention need to have been persistently 
present in two or more settings (e.g. home / school / work) since before the age of 12, 
interfering negatively with functions expected in those settings. DSM-5 updated the 
definition in the prior manual because this was deemed biased towards the symptoms 
of children compared to adolescents and adults. According to Williamson and 
Johnston (2015, p. 22) ‘the diagnostic criteria for ADHD were largely developed from 
samples of male children’ (see also Bailey, 2014, Waite and Ivey, 2009), but it is now 
recognized as a life-span issue. Research on adult ADHD has mushroomed, with over 
50% having been published in the last 5 years (Williamson and Johnson, 2015, 
Barkley, 2015).  
 
Identity and identification with ADHD 
 
The trends described above raise important questions about how and why adult 
women come to identify themselves as having ADHD. Unfortunately, Schott (2012, 
p.11) describes the literature on the identity development of adults with ADHD as 
‘dismal’, and studies on the actual process of ADHD diagnosis were described by 
McHoul and Rapley (2005, p.446) as ‘almost non-existent’. Despite the possibility of 
stigma (Wiener et al, 2012), according to Brady (2004), the diagnostic category can 
provide a framework for newly understanding a child’s behaviour and situation 
(Radcliffe et al, 2004), and, in the case of children’s diagnosis, is often triggered via 
the education system. Whilst some women will have been diagnosed in childhood, 
others come to identify with ADHD only as adults. The process of diagnosis is less 
clear with adults, and the relevance of identity is likely to play out very differently 
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(Weyandt & DuPaul, 2006). Self-diagnosis is particularly worthy of attention 
because, for many, ADHD falls into the category that Dumit (2005) describes as 
‘illnesses you have to fight to get’. In situations where people aim to get diagnosed, 
questions of identity (especially processes of self-identification with the diagnostic 
category) are likely to be important.  
 
Identity, in basic terms, is a dialogical phenomenon (Hermans and Hermans-
Konoptka, 2012): it is the response someone gives to the question ‘who are you?’ At a 
more complex level it is related to the theory a person develops about who and what 
they are amidst an ongoing stream of positioning and counter-positioning (see 
Wetherell and Mohanty, 2010). That theory – simultaneously personal (and pertaining 
to ontogenesis) and social (implicated in sociogenesis) - is both dialogical, and 
ongoingly revised (Gillespie and Cornish, 2010). As the latter authors point out, 
identity is as much about being identified as about making self-identifications 
(Duveen, 2001).  Identity is thus a relational process, not a state, and yet it serves as 
the source of a grounding attachment or commitment to how things ‘are’.  
 
ADHD becomes part of a person’s identity when it features as an aspect of their self-
descriptions and self-concept (Shames and Alden, 2005). One classic approach 
relevant to the current topic seeks to explain increases in diagnosis by linking identity 
to ‘medicalization’. This approach construes identity rather passively, emphasising 
the ‘being identified’ aspect more than the making of self-identifications. Medical 
categories like ADHD are criticized for being part of techniques of social control 
which use powerful drugs to manage otherwise disruptive conduct and to impose new 
‘medicalized’ identities on people, particularly schoolboys (Lloyd et al 2006). This 
approach offers a sociological explanation for high prevalence rates in the schools of 
North America, Australia and the UK (Malacrida, 2004). The medicalization thesis 
presupposes a resistant population who are unlikely to personally embrace the 
diagnosis, although Ilina Singh has found that mothers of ‘medicalized’ children may 
find an ADHD diagnosis ‘very welcome’ (2002, p. 593, see also Brady, 2014). This 
approach, however, becomes less plausible in situations where people appear to 
actively seek out an ADHD diagnosis for themselves, and this latter scenario is 
therefore of particular interest.  
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Other work dealing with identity takes an equally skeptical view of people’s motives 
for ADHD diagnosis. In the US, for example, where diagnosis has direct implications 
for health insurance, Conrad and Potter (2000, p.574) suggest that individuals ‘who, 
prior to diagnosis, would not have seen themselves having a disability find themselves 
reaping the benefits of disability legislation’. Comparable arguments have been raised 
about the self-interested benefits of pharmaceutical companies who benefit from 
recent relaxations of the formal criteria for diagnosis (Conrad and Potter, 2000, 
p.573).  Another argument focuses on the possibility that ADHD diagnosis might be 
desirable to some because its treatment by drugs can enhance people’s abilities to 
concentrate and perform intellectual tasks. In discussing adult ADHD, Conrad and 
Potter suggest that ‘medication treatment may be seen as much as an enhancement as 
a form of social control’ (2000, p. 575).   
 
Comstock (2011) points out that these kinds of efforts to explain the construction of 
an ADHD identity imply that the ‘ADHD individual’ is either manipulated by 
powerful others using partial knowledge, or acts in bad faith with respect to 
knowledge about ADHD for personal gain. Although he does not provide data, 
Comstock suggests that this ‘negative relation to knowledge’ can misrepresent how 
people creatively grapple with knowledge around ADHD to ‘positively make sense of 
their lives and behaviors in nontrivial ways’. Without denying that social control or 
benefits may occasionally play a role in diagnosis, he adopts a broadly Foucaultian 
perspective and asks for a deeper understanding of the complexities at play in an 
ADHD identity.  
 
This study aims to provide a theoretically informed empirical understanding of the 
processual complexities of identity formation and change. The interest is in 
examining how women make sense of ADHD from their own perspective, but with 
particular attention to the situated temporal dynamics of identity change. A main point 
of interest is thus in deepening knowledge of the temporal aspects of ADHD 
identities. To make this empirical contribution, however, it is necessary to briefly 
articulate a process theoretical approach able to grasp the temporal dimensions of 
identity-as-process. To this end we draw upon G.H. Mead (1980) whose version of 
‘process thought’ was directly influenced by the process philosophies of Henri 
Bergson and A.N. Whitehead. There is a growing interest in process thought within 
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psychology (Stenner and Weber, 2018), and Mead’s is just one of several important 
contributions. To give just two inspiring examples, Brown and Reavey (2015) draw 
upon Bergson, Deleuze and Kurt Lewin to explore the processual dynamics at play 
when ‘living with a difficult past’, whilst Zittoun and Gillespie (2015) modify 
sociocultural psychology and social representations theory using processual ideas 
from William James, C.S. Peirce and others to illuminate the temporality of 
biographies. Hence we do not claim that Mead’s work is of singular theoretical 
importance, although, like that of Lewin, it is relevant for present purposes because it 
is squarely located within social psychology.   
 
There are ‘many Mead’s’ (Gillespie, 2005), but he is best known - via the symbolic 
interactionism of Blumer (1980) - for his social theory of role-taking whereby we 
‘must be others if we are to be ourselves’ (1980: 194). For Mead, the emergence of 
the human self was a decisive and unique moment in animal evolution: ‘the self that is 
central to all so-called mental experience has appeared only in the social conduct of 
human vertebrates. It is just because the individual finds himself taking the attitudes 
of the others who are involved in his conduct that he becomes an object for himself. It 
is only by taking the roles of others that we have been able to come back to ourselves’ 
(Mead, 1980: 184). From this perspective, self-identity and society presuppose each 
other because the meaningful social acts that compose the activities of a complex 
human collective could not be coordinated but for the evolutionary emergence of 
human selves. Furthermore, by definition the human self cannot be treated as 
something self-contained and shut up, as it were, within its own world, and neither 
can it be treated as something that can exist within any isolated instant of time: the 
self is always something in passage (both from one perspective to another, and from 
one occasion to another). Because the self is always a synthesis-in-process that is 
mediated through the perspectives of others, so we humans often find ourselves swept 
up in what Mead calls ‘the passion of self-consciousness’ (194) whereby we ‘approve 
of ourselves and condemn ourselves. We pat ourselves upon the back and in blind 
fury attack ourselves’ (189). 
  
Whilst the remainder of this paper will certainly drawn upon this well known ‘role 
taking’ aspect of Mead’s social psychology, we ground these insights in a less well 
known ‘version’ of Mead that might be called ‘Mead-the-process-thinker’ (see Cook, 
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1979; da Silva, 2008; Stenner, 2017). The process theoretical basis of Mead’s thought 
is most fully expounded in his little known work The philosophy of the present, 
published posthumously in 1932. The following section will extract a number of 
analytically useful concepts from this work, including the related notions of the 
‘present’ as the ‘seat of reality’, the ‘emergent event’, the ‘revocable and irrevocable 
past’, the ‘prevising’ of a future, and the ‘passion of self-consciousness’. 
 
Theoretical orientation: a psychosocial process approach 
 
Mead’s process thought begins from the ontological position that the world in which 
we exist is a world ultimately composed of events or what Whitehead calls actual 
occasions (Stenner, 2008). With respect to psychology and the social sciences, it is 
the fate of human beings that our realities are actual only in a present and that our 
pasts and our futures gain their actuality only from our present moment: ‘reality exists 
in a present’ (Mead, 1980: 1). Since the past that has passed has ceased to exist, we 
are obliged to reconstruct it in every present moment, and we do so with an eye to a 
not yet existing future. And yet each present is an event that becomes and then 
perishes, its disappearance conditioning and giving rise to the next present occasion. 
The self-identity of the present is in this way continually informed by the past it 
constructs in the present. What we call ‘self’ or ‘self-identity’ thus stretches back to 
the past and forward to the future: but it hangs upon an always present occasion of 
actual experience. 
 
This theoretical stance frames our examination of how a diagnosis of ADHD informs 
women’s reconstructions of their pasts as they anticipate their futures. Rather than 
directly engage with the controversies surrounding the ontological status of ADHD, 
we observe that, as a social category, ADHD serves as a means or medium in the 
present to ‘make sense’ out of what has disappeared into the past in order to project a 
more comprehensible and manageable future. It serves, in short, as a resource for 
temporalising or for binding time. Arguably, there is little to be gained by polarised 
debate between those who stress that ADHD is a medical reality whose material truth 
must be insisted upon (Barkley, 1990, 1997, 2006; Hallowell & Ratey, 1995), and 
those who consider it a social construction implicated in the management of conduct 
deemed dysfunctional  (Conrad, 2007; Fitzgerald, 2009; Rafalovich, 2001, 2004; 
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Timimi, 2002, 2005; Timimi & Taylor, 2004). The first position places too much faith 
in the possibility of a secure grasp of a permanent reality (the irrevocability of the 
past) and the second gives itself too fully to the idea of an infinitely maleable past 
entirely subject to present social definition (the revocability of the past).   
 
Mead (1980: 2) argues that the past is ‘both irrevocable and revocable’. The key to 
the revocable nature of the past is the concept of the emergent: the emergent changes 
things. Mead (1980: 23) defines the emergent event as: 
 
the occurrence of something which is more than the processes that have led up 
to it and which by its change, continuance or disappearance, adds to later 
passages a content they would not otherwise have possessed.  
 
The emergent is thus novelty: a new becoming that was not there in advance. New 
ideas, for example, ‘emerge’ for a given individual, and new social practices (and 
identities) ‘emerge’ within a given community (Andreouli et al, 2019). The emergent 
always and only arises within the present, but its appearance creates a new standpoint 
– a new present - from which the past is looked back upon, and reconstructed. This is 
why Mead refers to the present as the ‘seat of reality’ (32). From the standpoint of the 
emergent, the past thus becomes a different past (see Kosseleck, 2004). Put 
differently, in light of the emergent, what can now be considered the ‘past past’ (7) 
becomes distinguishable from the ‘present past’ (i.e. the past proper to the newly 
emergent present). In other words, a past now recognised to be outmoded (the past 
past) is superseded by a past of a newly emergent present (the present past).  
 
If the emergent is the key to the revocability of the past, then for Mead, this by no 
means entails a denial of irrevocability: that the past is irrevocably gone and that it 
happened just as it happened, and in no other way. It is the fate of every present to 
slide into the past and thus to become a past present. What has passed cannot recur, 
although it always causally conditions the arising of the present. The irrevocability of 
the past, as Mead (1980: 3) suggests, concerns the fact that there is always and 
inevitably ‘a finality that goes with the passing of every event’. That something was 
and is no longer, is irrevocable and never changes, but what does change is the ‘what 
it was’ (3). The ‘what it was’ is, however, revocable because it concerns the 
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importance of ‘what it was’, and that importance belongs always (as a present past) to 
the present moment from which the past is reconstructed. The emergent event changes 
the past because it transforms that present importance.  
 
In this way, much like other process thinkers such as Whitehead and Simmel (see 
Stenner, 2017, 265-274), Mead is able to reconcile the initial insight that ‘reality 
exists in a present’ (1) with the equally important insight that there is no such thing as 
an ‘instant’ of present time abstracted from its past and future: ‘If we introduce a 
fictitious instantaneousness into a passing universe, things fall to pieces’ (177).  There 
is, rather, ‘an unalterable temporal direction in what is taking place’ (13)… and ‘in 
this passage what has occurred determines spatio-temporally what is passing into the 
future’ (13). What has taken place is part of a passage: it issues in what is taking 
place. Again, this irrevocability of passage does not preclude the revocability of the 
past’s importance to a changed present. The reconstruction of the past is basic to the 
conduct of any being that makes sense of events, the better to pre-empt the future and 
hence operate more effectively in the present.   
 
For Mead, then, the emergent introduces a new present that, if it is to sustain itself 
into the future, must reconstruct its past. This ‘if’ implies that an emergent present 
need not survive in a form that allows it to transmit its inheritance to the future. In 
other words, what Greco and Stenner (2017) call a pattern shift need not occur on the 
strength of an ‘emergent’ alone. If the emergent is to be accepted as a new present, 
the past must be re-written from the new standpoint it opens up (Hacking, 2008). 
Once re-written, the emergent ceases to be an unpredictable novel event. With the 
benefit of hindsight, it ‘ceases to be an emergent and then follows from the past which 
has replaced the former past’ (Mead, 1980: 11). The past thus ceases to appear 
revocable, and relapses into the seeming irrevocability whereby what is now taking 
place necessarily follows from what necessarily took place. Rather than appearing as 
a shocking rupture, the emergent present, to use Mead’s neologism, now has a past 
which issues into a present which can ‘previse’ (12) a predictable future (i.e. to see or 
predict it in advance, or to expect it). In the report below we attempt to clearly 
illustrate these abstract theoretical processes using the accounts of our participants as 
they explain how their knowledge of ADHD affected the temporality of their identity.   
Method 
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The project worked with a small strategically sampled group of participants. This 
obviously limits the conclusions that can be drawn from the study, but our aim was 
not to generalise to a broader population but to gain rich insight into a small number 
of cases. Following receipt of full ethical clearance, participants were initially 
recruited through two routes: an online support group for people with ADHD, and 
two local community support groups. Women with a formal diagnosis (whether in 
childhood or in adulthood), and also women who self-diagnosed with ADHD (without 
a formal diagnosis), were invited to participate in the study. This recruitment strategy 
yielded 14 interviewees, but since none had been diagnosed during childhood, a 
further round of recruitment was undertaken through a local university, yielding two 
more participants who had received diagnoses as teenagers. Participants were given 
the choice to be interviewed face to face in community centres, or if preferred, by 
telephone.   
 
An interview guide was developed, informed by previous research, to explore key 
issues of identity and transition for women with ADHD. Interviews began with the 
researcher expressing an interest in the participant’s life story with respect to ADHD, 
including how ADHD may have impacted their life at different moments, and inviting 
them to talk about all aspects that they consider relevant.  They were told to expect 
that the researcher will keep interruptions and further questions to a minimum and 
will be prepared to allow long pauses for reflection should these occur. Nine of the 16 
participants were self-diagnosed at time of interview, and 5 of the remaining 7 had 
received formal diagnoses of ADHD as adults.  
 
The 16 interviews were transcribed verbatim and the content anonymized. The data 
corpus was coded following an initial thematic analysis during which each audio 
recording was listened to by at least one analyst while reading the transcript to 
enhance accuracy. The data was then subjected to a thematic decomposition by a 
second analyst (Stenner, 1992, 1993; Ussher & Mooney-Somers, 2000, Ussher, 
2003). Unlike pure thematic analysis (and some forms of grounded theory) which 
analyse a data corpus structurally into cross-cutting content themes, thematic 
decomposition does not pretend to a purely inductive and complete identification of 
themes, but works dialogically between theory and data, often deploying positioning 
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theory (Davies and Harré, 1990) and other forms of process thought. In the analysis 
below we sought to identify content that speaks to transformative events and 
reinterpretations of the past (Stenner et al, 2012). The aim was to give a theoretically 
nuanced but data-grounded exegesis of the interview content through the 
identification of themes that indicate dynamic constructions and reconstructions of 
reality. Thematic decomposition shares with discourse analysis (Potter and Wetherell, 
1987) an attunement to the action orientation of discourse, but without ‘bracketing 
out’ the experiential backdrop to the communication process.   
 
Results of the analysis 
 
The analysis will focus on a sub-set of participants whose accounts were particularly 
relevant to the thesis of this paper. This is because they used remarkably similar terms 
to describe a key moment of realisation that the category ADHD applies to them. This 
opens a space for putting Mead’s concept of the ‘emergent event’ to analytical use, 
along with the related concepts described above. For these participants – whom we 
will call Ruth, Sarah, Jill and Maria - this moment of realisation was connected to 
discussions around the ADHD of their own child. The formal diagnoses of three of 
these participants (Sarah, Jill and Maria) were prompted by these experiences (Ruth is 
self-diagnosed).  
 
Before presenting the analysis, it is important to be clear that we are not claiming that 
this kind of emergent experiential event prompted by their own children was a feature 
for all of the women in our sample (several of whom did not have children). Some, 
for example, identified with ADHD after seeking help in connection with other co-
morbid conditions. For example, participant 6 – who sought help for an eating 
disorder and drug abuse - describes ‘a slow dawning realisation’ that the category 
ADHD applies to her, rather than a decisive event. Participant 1 describes a phase of 
difficulty in college – attributed at first to dyslexia and dyscalculia - during which 
‘alarm bells started ringing’ about ADHD. Others (five participants in particular) 
recognised themselves via their child’s diagnosis but did not describe this in terms of 
a distinctive emergent event of realization. Finally, another participant does describe 
an emergent event, but not one connected to children. She describes walking in circles 
around a friend in a supermarket while being told she might have ADHD. She 
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promptly looked it up on the internet and describes a ‘wow!’ experience. Without 
denying these very different experiences, the following analysis will focus on the 
accounts from Ruth, Sarah, Jill and Maria.  
 
ADHD identity as product of an emergent event: a ‘lightbulb moment’  
 
In the accounts of this sub-set, the moment of realisation is described as a life-
changing event. For Sarah, Jill and Maria this emergent event triggered a prolonged 
quest for diagnosis.  Maria, for example, states that her daughter: 
 
has a diagnosis of ADHD….And that’s where we realised that I had it…. My 
dad was in total denial, absolutely idolises my daughter and vice versa and he 
was, “no, there’s nothing wrong with her”, but equally would keep saying, 
“why does she do that, why does” - and in the end I, I, I still hadn’t clicked. I 
showed him the symptoms and he looked at them and he just went, “that’s 
you”, and we both went, “oh my goodness, that’s me!”   
 
Maria describes her initial disagreement with her father over the ADHD status of her 
daughter. The doting grandfather cannot accept that there may be something ‘wrong’ 
with his granddaughter and yet is also sufficiently unsettled to keep asking questions. 
During a decisive moment whilst considering typical ADHD symptoms, the father 
comes to newly recognise that these symptoms apply to his daughter. This in turn 
allows Maria to view herself as a new object from her father’s perspective. Taking her 
father’s perspective to herself, Maria describes how the same shock of self-
recognition ‘clicked’ for her (“oh my goodness, that’s me”). The sense of surprise 
expresses the novelty of the self that is observable for the first time thanks to this new 
perspective. 
   
Jill uses the expression ‘lightbulb moment’ to describe her very similar story:  
 
I think it had pretty much been two years to diagnosis from my first lightbulb 
moment of, “oh, ADHD, hello”…   ...and the prompt was entirely my son’s 
behaviour and his progress through the education system.   
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We must of course recognise that these metaphors of ‘clicking’ and ‘lightbulbs’ also 
serve a rhetorical purpose of heightening the listener’s interest in the account. The 
fact that these episodes may not have been as instantaneous as the opening of an 
electric circuit, however, should not distract us from their subjective importance in the 
temporal unfolding of our participant’s experiences. This importance expresses their 
emergent quality as novel and unpredictable events of insight, and it is this novelty – 
along with the associated illumination - that is captured in the lightbulb / clicking 
metaphors. The emergent event of novel self-recognition is surprising because, 
looking backwards, it introduces a new element that affords a reconstruction of a past 
that now belongs to a present that has been superseded. We might say that a new 
present now has the potential of superseding a past present. Also, looking forwards, 
the emergent event lends the subsequent passage of events a new content and new 
possibilities.  The emergent event, in short, opens the possibility for a subjective 
pattern shift whereby a previous pattern of self-consciousness passes into another: 
after the event, things are different because the ‘self’ which presides over temporal 
experience occupies a new present (see Greco and Stenner, 2017).  
 
As noted in the introduction, such subjective pattern shifts do not follow an emergent 
event automatically. Rather, if the novel perspective is to endure and be efficacious in 
the future, the past must be meticulously reconstructed from the vantage point of its 
newly emergent present, and this takes time and commitment. Participants described 
the emergent event - the ‘click’ or ‘lightbulb’ moment -  being followed by a 
prolonged phase of actively seeking a diagnosis, despite obstacles: ‘a very difficult 
two years’ (Maria). Note that, for these participants, diagnosis did not prompt the 
pattern shift, but followed from it as a form of validation by way of formal external 
recognition. Jill describes a ‘two-year fight to, to get it recognised. …because it took 
an awful lot of evidence to get it...’. Sarah offers a similar account: 
 
‘the reason why I got diagnosed was because I have a 13-year-old son… diagnosed 
with ADHD last June’…once Jack was diagnosed I was very proactive at looking at 
ADHD’.  
 
In these cases, it is not the occurrence of a formal diagnosis that constitutes the 
emergent event, but the emergent event of transformed recognition that sets in motion 
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the process of acquiring a diagnosis. The formal recognition bestowed by a diagnosis 
therefore supplements a prior subjective transformation or pattern shift, and it is this 
that can be described as the acquisition of an ‘ADHD identity’.   
 
Transformation of the meaning of the ‘object’ called ADHD 
 
As described in the introduction, the category of ADHD as a ‘social object’ serves to 
reconstruct a sector of experience and conduct relating to problems with attention as 
causally influenced by a specific medical condition. The category thus gives a new 
salience to this sector of experience and conduct, singling it out as a coherent figure 
for thought, communication and practical attention. Since ADHD is a medical 
diagnosis, the category comes with a sense of scientific ‘factuality’, although in 
ordinary discourse and some media coverage it is also often treated as controversial 
(Horton-Salway, 2011, 2013). Like most adult members of society, these participants 
had encountered the category of ADHD prior to their pattern shift. The emergent 
event of a ‘lightbulb’ experience, however, entails a new encounter with the ‘object’ 
ADHD, and thus involves a decisive change in the meaning of this object: ADHD is 
resignified. Participants, for example, describe having been familiar with the word 
‘ADHD’ before the emergent event, but having understood it in a trivial way, perhaps 
as a controversial media topic, or as the subject of gossip amongst parents about 
‘naughty boys’. Some, for example, described it as a ‘dirty word’ or a ‘stereotype’. 
The emergent event occasions the transformation of this trivial understanding of the 
object into something that is experienced as far richer and deeper. After the event, in 
other words, the participants are able to view the object ‘ADHD’ from two very 
different perspectives. On the one hand, they have the perspective of a world they 
occupied in the past (their ‘past present’ with its now ‘past past’), and, on the other, 
that of the world they now occupy (the ‘present present’ with its ‘present past’).   
 
Before Ruth became aware of her own possible ADHD status through the diagnosis of 
her son, she reports thinking that:   
 
ADHD is somewhat of a dirty word still uhm so I think that was more ..it 
certainly wasn’t anything I overheard or …just in the media didn’t really 
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know anything about it… …I knew the word ADHD existed but I didn’t know 
anything until I actually had my son uh…   
  
In a comparable way, Jill states that after her son’s diagnosis she: ‘actually stopped, 
um, stereotyping ADHD as a thing and actually looked at what it involved’.  
 
These extracts tell the story of a newly discovered sensitivity to the complexity of 
ADHD as an object, and to the ever-present possibility of stereotyped understandings. 
To analytically illustrate another of Mead’s concepts, this new sensitivity is 
associated with a new importance which is carried forward in the form of a strong 
critical appreciation of how ADHD can be poorly understood to the detriment of those 
who are characterised by it. The interviews are saturated with a sense of the 
participants having for too long misrecognised their own natures, having been 
recurrently misrecognised by others in the past, and having to challenge the ever 
present likelihood of misrecognition by others in the present and in the future. They 
have been misrecognised as the ‘class joker’ (Ruth), as ‘a spoilt little bitch’ (Sarah, 
p.3), as ‘aggressive’, ‘rude’ and ‘moody’ (Jill) as an ‘absolute nightmare’ and 
‘naughty’ (Maria), and so on, and it is likely that these misrecognitions were, for each 
of these women, key ingredients in what Mead called ‘the passion of self-
consciousness’. Fidelity to the emergent event means correcting these problematic 
constructions by reconstructing the past from the vantage point of the new present it 
brings into view. This task, or effort after reconstruction, in turn comes to occupy the 
immediate future of our participants. Ruth, for example, describes herself as a 
‘flagship’ whose mission is to enlighten people about the difference between the true 
nature of ADHD and the stereotypical misunderstandings:  
 
…we need to set the record straight here I’m a kind of flagship… because I’d 
like to enlighten everybody I like to sort of enlighten everyone with my 
knowledge and actually people don’t always want it.  
 
In becoming a flagship, Ruth, as it were, says ‘no’ to the future that would follow 
from her past present, and she says ‘yes’ to a different possible future that would 
follow from the consolidation of her emergent present (a ‘future future’). Through the 
emergent event, then, the category ADHD acquires a new and intense personal 
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meaning as these participants encounter a richer reality to it and, at the same moment, 
begin to apply the category to themselves, their children, and others around them 
(particularly other family members). The category of ADHD, once reconstructed in a 
‘lightbulb moment’, affords the emergence of a new ADHD identity, displacing the 
old. The self-consciousness underpinning this identity supplies the participants with a 
new perspective on their lives and on the person they have always been. Achieving 
this new vantage point is a decisive moment, but, as we have seen, it does not 
complete or exhaust the process of pattern shift. Rather, it sets it in motion by creating 
a new present perspective from which the meaning of events from the past, and of 
possibilities for the future, can be more or less painstakingly reconstructed and re-
imagined. Participant 3 (page 2-3), for example, describes: 
 
always thinking there was something wrong with me. I remember always kind 
of being told that I was a drama queen, that I was a spoilt little bitch, that I 
was a fidget, that I was nosy… that, you know, all of that kind of stuff, I, you 
know, so I kind of grew up thinking that I was just a spoilt little cow who 
wanted, you know, wanted everything.  My brother and sister hated me. 
 
An emergent ADHD identity enabled this participant to reconstruct such events and 
thus to re-evaluate the deeply sedimented sense that she had been 'bad' since 
childhood: ‘I used to think that something very, very bad had happened to me and I’d 
blocked it out....  And the ADHD kind of made me stop looking.’ What was her 
present past, in other words, has become a past of the past (a past past). The intensity 
of this transformation - and its implications for the future - is well described by Sarah:   
 
I desperately wanted help and I think when I, when I went to the treatment 
centre on my own accord, it was almost then that I thought, this is what I’ve 
been looking for my whole, whole life, somebody to listen to me, to what I’m 
saying and not say, don’t be so stupid.  And, and now I recognise, you know, 
like because I’ve done so much work on myself and because I’ve learnt so 
much, I recognise that my dad has probably got ADHD. 
 
Transformation of the subject: ADHD as pivotal to a new identity, with a newly 
irrevocable past  
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The above analysis shows how an emergent event can be the occasion for the 
becoming of a new ‘ADHD identity’ which, in the words of Maria, ‘really, really 
defines me’. This identity provides a new present from which perspective Mead’s 
revocable past can be reconstructed. The following quotations illustrate quite how 
meaningful that new identity is for those who acquire it:   
 
…it’s who you are it’s who I am to every fibre of who I am (Ruth). 
 
Um, however, since the, the diagnosis, oh, oh it’s, I, I can only see my life 
now post-diagnosis and pre-diagnosis, I am a different person (Maria). 
 
I really, really love what ADHD brings for me, if that makes sense… It makes, 
um, I think it makes me a really interesting person to be around… Whereas 
before I used to see who I was as a flaw and everything like that. Now I 
almost feel like I’m lucky to have what I have and to be who I am (Sarah). 
 
Yeah, I like it. I’m proud of it and I’m actually now really, really bloody 
proud of myself… because I’ve had so many people knock me and I’ve had so 
many people put me down… I have also been immensely critical of myself. 
Yeah. (Jill). 
 
…everything about me from my height to my looks everything is down to my 
ADHD I believe everything that is who I am I think it’s because I have a 
tendency to stand up for what I think  is right it’s again back again to the very 
young, right and wrong, the injustice of it all… (Ruth) 
 
The sense of injustice invoked in the last extract (and of pride and love in the other) is 
important (it expresses the importance that Mead presents as pivotal to the revocation 
of a past). It expresses the fact that the emergent becoming we are describing is not 
merely a neutral, intellectual, cognitive affair but a deeply felt and thoroughly 
evaluative struggle. In the next section we explore the proposition that the emotional 
stakes involved in the new ADHD identity are very high because, for each of our 
participants, the old (superseded) identity was a morally troubled identity. It was an 
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identity characterised by forms of conflict and guilt, criticism and self-criticism that 
characterise Mead’s ‘passion of self-consciousness’.  
 
The deeply troubled nature of the old identity: the passion of self-consciousness 
 
Each of these participants describe very difficult childhoods marked by a sense of 
self-hatred and self-destruction arising within difficult family relationships. Ruth, who 
was brought up mostly by her grandparents, describes a long history of feeling 
resented by other family members for her ‘loudness’ and for appearing out of place. 
She describes episodes of being bullied and bullying at school (including physically 
attacking a teacher) and expresses a profound sense of the injustice of her situation:  
 
we were all sitting down waiting for stories and I’d got up and said to the child 
‘can you save my space?’ the child had then not saved the space and let 
someone else in uhm I thought there was plenty of room we could all sit down 
I sat down again the supply teacher had uhm said ‘no you’re not sitting there’ 
‘but I was sitting there first’ again the injustice of it all uhm so basically I 
wouldn’t move so she told the whole class they could do whatever they 
wanted to me as long as they moved me off the chair so thirty children or 29 
trying to kick me hit me punch me in the class. 
 
Sarah also describes a difficult childhood ‘I cried all the time, very lonely, very sad, 
being on my own and almost the voice inside my head was my only friend’. The 
youngest of three children, she describes feeling excluded from the close bond 
between her older brother and sister whose agendas dominated her parents’ concerns. 
She describes her relationship to her sister (who ‘completely preoccupied life at 
home’ after having a son aged 15) in quite moving terms:  
 
I almost loved my sister so desperately and wanted her approval and wanted 
her to like me, because she hated me, but at the same time I almost wanted to 
be better than her in my parents’ eyes… I wanted to be like her, but I also 
wanted to destroy her and that went on for a long, long time.  
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She felt resented - ‘always kind of being told that I was a drama queen, that I was a 
spoilt little bitch, that I was a fidget, that I was nosy… my brother and sister hated 
me’ – and her response was to try to ruin their relationship: ‘I would just sit outside 
her bedroom door just kicking it constantly’. At school she ‘was bullied or became the 
bully’ and had begun smoking, stealing, drinking and being sexually active by the 
time she was 10. As a teenager and young adult she describes regularly drinking until 
she passed out, moving ‘in and out of relationships’ and engaging in a pattern of 
binge eating and self-starvation. 
 
Jill describes herself as having grown up with negative thinking ‘as a very small child 
in a very odd household’ where she felt she could never meet the ‘expectations laid on 
me’ by her parents and that she had ‘not ever really had parental approval’. She says 
that ‘as a small child actually felt I was living in the wrong family’ and that ‘I didn’t 
like being a child’. She describes arguments with her mother over who is to blame for 
her character (which she describes as ‘wilful non-compliance or wilful neglect of 
myself’): ‘My mum’s always saying, “oh you blame us for everything, you know, you 
were wild… it’s not our fault”’. She perceived that ‘there was like almost like a 
malevolence within me… What I felt was that I was actually a bad person… I was not 
an adequate human being’. At school, she describes herself as ‘wild’ and ‘like some 
wild animal had turned up in class and they were like, what do we do with, with her’. 
As a young adult, she would ‘get drunk beyond belief… and I was promiscuous’, and 
she became a drug user, describing herself as ‘a very addictive obsessive’. She tried to 
take her own life ‘seriously on two attempts’. 
 
Maria says comparatively little about her own childhood, but describes depression as 
being a ‘mainstay of my life’ and she defines her life as a ‘never ending, um, failure’ 
and a struggle: ‘I had one of the mums at school say to me, what do you do all day?  
And it was very easy, one word answer, struggle’. As a young person, she ‘had, um, 
anorexia, um, and bulimia’ and she ‘was suicidal in the past’ and has a diagnosis of 
bi-polar depression. Relationships have ‘never lasted for very long’ and they’ve 
always gone wrong, um, and they, I, I’ve never been married’. 
  
Giving oneself some slack by letting oneself off the hook  
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The profound desire for transformation described above is easily understandable 
given the troubled nature of these ‘old’ identities. Participants describe in vivid terms 
how the emergence of their new ADHD identity served as the basis for a new present 
from which they could reconstruct a more accepting identity that they could be more 
proud of and positive about. Maria, for example, describes how she is now able to 
give herself ‘some slack’: 
 
…I, I get confused and overwhelmed so easily.  The difference now is I don’t 
berate myself as, as much, if, if at all I suppose.  No, I suppose I still do, but 
nowhere near as much…  I give myself some slack.  I understand that I have a 
disability, a huge disability that’s had this -because I have it quite severely I 
think. 
 
Sarah uses the different but comparable phrase of letting herself ‘off the hook’ to 
express the same relief from embattled self-criticism. She extends this changed 
attitude to her son, who she now supports rather than criticizes (she now fights ‘his 
corner’): 
 
Um, it’s answered a lot of questions.  Um, it’s kind of let, I let myself off the 
hook.  I forgive my - I, I believe that Max was sent to me as a gift to teach me 
and I almost feel that as I work through his problems with him and do the 
things that he needs, I’m healing that little girl inside of me.  So, when he 
comes home from school and says that things happen with a teacher I believe 
him and I step up and speak to his teacher about it and fight his corner, 
whereas I grew up in an environment was, well, you shouldn’t have done that.  
So, so I almost feel like, like as I fight his corner I fight mine too.  
 
The category of ADHD thus allowed her to entertain a more positive and tolerant 
relationship towards her self and her child:  
 
Um, it’s hard in the sense of the guilt that I feel around my, my children and 
the behaviours, my behaviours towards, towards my parenting skills and the 
things, but, you know, I have to tell myself that I was sick and that I didn’t 
know any different...   
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In explaining their situation, these participants are very aware of the potential 
accusation that ADHD can be used as an ‘excuse for behaviour word’ (Ruth). From 
their perspective, however, they are not offering excuses for past conduct, but 
understanding it:  
 
I’m not saying, “oh it was an excuse”. I know I did some really shit things! I 
behaved really badly at the time… There’s no beating around the bush. I’ve 
done the guilt, I’ve done the shame… What I’ve said is, “you’ve had ADHD 
which is actually fairly debilitating… and what you did is understandable… in 
those circumstances. (Jill) 
 
And I like my - I’m going to get upset now - I like myself, um, and it is the 
reason for all of those things and that it’s not an excuse….. It’s absolutely 
100% the reason why I struggled at all of those things and probably will 
forevermore and unfortunately you’ve got this condition which affects 
memory, organisation, distractibility and then you’ve got age and it’s probably 
going to get worse!  (Maria) 
 
With the benefit of hindsight: lay psychological theories of self-formation 
 
Through reconstructing their past experiences in the light of the perspective afforded 
by an ADHD identity, these participants are able to newly understand, not just their 
past feelings and conduct, but also other people’s past reactions to that conduct, and 
their own past reactions to those reactions. In this way, they are able to unpick the 
process of their own self-formation, and to grasp – or at least offer a theory about - 
how their own and other people’s past ignorance of ADHD has contributed to the 
construction of their own self concept and conduct. To use Mead’s neologism, on the 
basis of a newly constructed past, they are able to previse the future. Jill expresses this 
quite complex ‘lay’ social psychology in the following terms: 
 
And obviously there’s a knock on effect, there’s cause and effect and one 
thing leads to another and I can look back and say, well, if my parents had 
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been a little different, you know, well, if this had happened, well, if that had 
happened, but I don’t regret it.  
 
Participants thus do not offer simplistic causal stories about how their behaviour 
issues in a linear fashion from a medical condition of ADHD. Rather, the very 
misunderstanding of ADHD enters as an active ingredient into their psychosocial 
formation through a complex layering of events upon events. For example, Jill 
observes that if her parents had known about ADHD when she was a child, she may 
not have developed the ‘negativity loop’ of self-criticism, ‘wilful non-compliance’ 
and self-neglect. Sarah likewise observes that with earlier knowledge of ADHD, she 
might have felt less isolated and needy and so might not have engaged in the 
misbehaviour that provoked the punitive reactions from her parents that fed into the 
next phase of her misconduct. In these lay theories, ADHD does not cause anything 
directly, but feeds into the way practical and emotional reality gets constructed both 
by and for the participant. Unsurprisingly, the holistic and temporal complexity of 
these lay theories imply that it is not discrete facts that can serve as evidence for the 
importance of ADHD, but the entire life of a person with ADHD: 
 
Um, I have to be honest, that’s not across the board with my family and I 
have, there’s a huge gap now between me and my sister, because she, she 
doesn’t understand…  at the beginning she didn’t even believe that I had either 
of these conditions and she was sort of belittling me and at one stage my mum 
and dad went round with evidence and I thought, but why are you doing that, 
why should you have to? My whole life is, is the evidence… (Maria). 
 
Discussion 
  
The analysis offered in this paper draws on the experiences of a small number of 
women who identify with ADHD. These experiences were theorised with the help of 
a number of interconnected analytical concepts drawn from Mead, including the 
emergent event, the irrevocable past, the revocable past (where transformations of 
‘importance’ allow a past past to be distinguished from a present past), the ‘prevised’ 
future, and the passion of self-consciousness. Without wishing to universalise these 
theorised experiences, it seems clear that they are, when sensitively analysed, very 
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informative about one of the routes by which women in the UK are coming to identify 
with, and seek out a diagnosis for ADHD during their adult years. It provides some 
insight, for example, into what Williamson and Johnston (2015, p.23) describe as 
‘higher rates of treatment seeking for adult women compared to men’.  
 
The analysis provides examples of how women can come to a new sense of 
themselves as adults with ADHD via an encounter with the ADHD of their own 
children. It provides a detailed picture of how an emergent event can participate in 
transforming a prior identity based on a history of often very difficult experiences and 
life problems, and of the often meticulous process of personal reconstruction this 
entails. We can, therefore, better understand the centrality the new identity has for 
these women, and the energy and commitment with which they can take forward their 
message about ADHD. We can also understand how, once the new identity has 
sedimented, the past informed by ADHD itself becomes an irrevocable past with a 
facticity that can seem beyond question. These findings indicate the value of a 
methodological approach informed by the process thinking of Mead and others, which 
draws attention to the often quite subtle and complex ‘lay social psychology’ 
articulated by the participants themselves. 
 
Our concerns with the temporal reconstruction of identity provide a potentially 
fruitful way out from the impasse of an increasingly polarised debate in which ADHD 
is presented either as a form of social control, a strategy for gaining welfare benefits 
or a means for drug companies to amass further wealth, on the one hand, or on the 
other, as a medical condition whose biological veracity must simply be insisted upon. 
It is quite possible that, in different circumstances, it is all of these things, and yet it is 
also a way in which people can make sense of the complexity of their difficult lives, 
the better to become more active in the present.  
 
It is, however, important to re-affirm that the reality expressed by the participants 
discussed in this paper is not the only reality in our sample, let alone in the wider-
world. Our analysis in no way denies that there are other routes through which women 
encounter and adopt an ADHD identity, and future research should explore this 
variety. Indeed, we agree with Brown and Reavey (2015: 211) when they insist upon 
the situational specificity of experiences of all kinds, whilst also aiming to develop 
 25 
concepts which ‘are meant to make connections beyond particular cases’. Concepts 
like the ‘revocable past’ are not meant as transcendent categories into which data 
chunks can be coded, but as common notions which point to commonalities between 
cases that, in themselves, are always radically specific. The concept of the 
‘irrevocable past’ then serves in a comparable way, but also as a corrective to any 
one-sided tendency (encouraged by its partner the ‘revocable past’) to stress 
contingency over irreversibility (or vice versa).  
 
It is also important to affirm the partial and selective nature of our analysis. We have 
worked, for the most part, with a small set of concepts from Mead’s Philosophy of the 
present and applied them to those aspects of our interview transcripts which afford 
illumination by way of them. An extended and more substantial analysis might 
connect this to a variety of other bodies of work with which our approach is in 
dialogue. For example, it would be useful to attend to what Brown and Reavey (2015: 
210) call the ‘setting specificity’ of participant’s experience. For those women who 
encountered their own ADHD through that of their children, for example, the school 
setting was decisively important, and schools as institutional spaces clearly play a key 
role in patterning the experiences that unfolded (as do medical encounters in GP 
waiting rooms, experiences in work places, and so on). More emphasis could also be 
placed on gendered relations of power or on the institutional power of medicine 
(Hacking, 1998). Connections could also be made to what Brown and Reavey (2015: 
107) refer to, not just as experiencing ‘with, through and for others’ (as when Maria 
realises she might have ADHD ‘though’ her father’s recollection of her as a child) but 
also as ‘managing the memories of others’ (as when Maria manages the ‘gap’ in 
understanding that exists between herself and her sister).  
 
Inflected beyond memory, it would also be useful to further expand the connections to 
work on ruptures and transitions more generally. From the perspective developed by 
Zittoun (2008), for example, ‘emergent events’ followed by a transformed process of 
re-signification and re-description might be described as ‘ruptures’ followed by 
‘transitions’, where the latter includes the use of ‘symbolic resources’ to re-position 
and re-locate the person in the symbolic and social field of their life-space.  This in 
turn raises important questions of agency and affect, including the extent to which the 
phases of transition which follow events that rupture biographical trajectories are such 
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that they increase or diminish the powers of the actors involved (Stenner et al 2011), 
or perhaps hold them suspended in a ‘liminal hotspot’ (Greco and Stenner, 2017). 
 
Finally, we hope that our analysis provides a window into the growing tendency to 
reject pathologizing aspects of diagnoses (where difference is equated with 
diminished value), and to stress instead a discourse of difference grounded in equality 
(Silberman, 2015). Indeed developments in critical disability studies, particularly 
critical autism studies offer a way of enabling a discourse of difference and equality 
(O’Dell et al, 2016; Davidson & Orsini, 2015). The category of ADHD allowed our 
participants to reconstruct what they previously thought of as highly negative aspects 
of their characters as forms of difference that have been subjected to systematic 
misunderstanding. This allows them to affirm the value of their difference.  
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